An essay I wrote for my philosophy class.
The idea of determinism (where all voluntary or involuntary behaviour is pre-determined) is associated and linked with the concept of futility (life does not have significance, value or purpose). If everything in our lives is predetermined, even with our supposed choices resulting in the same, predetermined outcome – why even bother? Is the idea of free will inherently flawed? or is the human will and spirit to persevere great enough even to overcome the task of a fixed future, past and present?
In my philological view, the universe is deterministic, however, there are opportunities for free will. Though pre-existing causes determine future events, the journey between the consequences is up to the individual. Someone’s free will stems from their perception of free will and their own belief in freedom. The thought that one cannot alter their outcome causes the idea of it to be a constraint, while determinism does not. ‘The view that there is really is no conflict between determinism and free will—that free will and determinism are compatible—is known as compatibilism’ (Kane, 2005, p.12) also known as soft determinism. There are two sides to determinism, hard determinism and soft determinism (or compatibilism). Therefore, one can have free will in a deterministic universe because of compatibilism. The compatibilist definition of determinism allows for free will. That is why definitions are important, they allow for one to have freedom and determinism through compatibilism or soft determinism. While hard determinism does not support freedom and libertarian free will does not support determinism. The theory that allows both to coexist is soft determinism.
In Michael Norwitz’s article, he looks at anti-compatibilist van Inwagen’s views and discusses them with compatibilist Dennet to discuss the relationship between free will and determinism. Norwitz focuses on van Inwagen as he ‘presents three premises in his main argument: that free will is in fact incompatible with determinism, that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism, and that (since we have moral responsibility) determinism is false. ‘Hence, he concludes, we have free will’ (Norwitz, 1991). Ultimately van Inwagen disproves determinism because there is proof of free will due to moral responsibility. Norwitz then compares van Inwagen’s points to Dennet’s whose issue with van Inwagen’s approach to the discussion is the impact moral responsibility holds. Even if actions are predetermined, each action holds a consequence, and that affects the individual's soul, their mindset and ultimately their life. Norwitz states that ‘Dennett claims there are cases of responsible action when one could not have done otherwise (…) Dennett asks, what is it we want to know of a person when we wonder, could he have done otherwise in a particular situation? (…) Dennett rejects this formulation of the question as unanswerable, and even if answerable as unhelpful in determining responsibility’ (Norwitz 1991). He explains his reject of the answer because ‘we would still hold people morally responsible whether we accepted van Inwagen’s concept of free will or not, because the considerations we have in mind when we ask whether someone “could have done otherwise” are irrelevant to issues of free will and determinism’ (Norwitz 1991). Because Dennett does not think that moral responsibility is relevant to free will and determinism, then it is unable to prove free will and cannot disprove determinism. Throughout Norwitz’s article, he agrees and disagrees with both parties. He agrees with van Inwagen by stating ‘it is premature to claim that determinism (neurologically if not cosmologically) is true’ (Norwitz 1991) however he goes further than van Inwagen by stating ‘it is certainly premature to claim that it is false as well’ (Norwitz 1991). Norwitz considers ‘Dennett’s recommendations are worth taking seriously,’ (Norwitz 1991) throughout his discussion, he combines van Inwagens and Dennett's views, while he is unable to come to a firm view of determinism and does not believe that there is a possible resolution between van Inwagen and Dennetts without compromising and further analysing the subject of free will.
Nigel Pleasants discusses the relationship between free will and determinism in his article along with the ‘problem of structure and agency in the social sciences’ (Pleasants, 2018). Pleasants recognizes the reason free will and determinism oppose each other is that ‘at the core of the debate over free will and determinism: how can an action that is caused be free? The very idea can seem oxymoronic’ (Pleasants, 2018) as the idea of determinism is to be predicted and planned out then free will cannot be free. This causes the question to then be altered if we live in a deterministic universe that does not believe in free will, how is it possible for individuals to have it? Pleasants includes the society structure by stating that ‘I contend, though, that the ontology of social structure is irrelevant to the question of whether, and how, it impacts causally on individuals’ possibilities of action’ (Pleasants, 2018) and saying the impact of the action can impart the idea of freedom. Pleasants points out that determinism is not fatalism which allows free will to be included in the argument.
As stated above, there is room for free will in determinism through soft–determinism. The reason some do not believe that determinism and free will coexist is that as Robert Kane puts it ‘most persons resit the idea that free will and determinism might be compatible when they first encounter it,’ (Kane, 2005, p.12) because as Pleasants states, fatalism is not determinism. I agree with Pleasants regarding the importance of an action that impacts the ability to have free will. As van Inwagen argued that free will means moral responsibility, Dennet disagreed. Kane explains free will regarding compatibilism as ‘to have the power or ability to do what we want or desire to do, which in turn entails an absence of constraints or impediments (such as physical restraints, coercion, and compulsions) preventing us from doing what we want’ (Kane, 2005, p.13) which supports Pleasants’ claim about the importance of the action. At the beginning of the course, my belief in free will was similar to an avatar in a video game, that I truly hold no control over my choices. Throughout these weeks I have identified my original belief as determinism. I still agree with determinism, however, instead of hard determinism I align with soft determinism. I may still be an avatar in a video game, however, the way I accomplish the quests are up to me. And the success of the challenge will be predetermined by past actions and moral choices.
One can have free will in a deterministic universe because the universe is soft–determinism and as Pleasants discussed, having free will depends on the importance of the event. By having the choice to make the decision without constraints along with the fact that determinism is not fatalism. By having freedom and control over small everyday events, however, if the individual does not believe that they have free will, that will cause them to not acknowledge and use the freedom they have. That does not mean they do not have free will, but that the individual is not utilizing it.
Bibliography
Kane, R. (2005), ‘Compatibilism’. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp 12- 22.
Norwitz, M. (1991) Free Will and Determinism |Issue 1| Philosophy Now. [online] Available at: https://philosophynow.org/issues/1/Free_Will_and_Determinism [accessed 9/12/2022].
Pleasants, N. (2018) ‘Free Will, Determinism and the “Problem” of Structure and Agency in the Social Sciences’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 3-30. doi:10.1177/0048393118814952.
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